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FROM HILLENBRAND

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German Delegation briefed four power working group this afternoon on German Ambassador Kroll's conversation with Gromyko April 13 (we are summarizing here in event not available other sources). According to Kroll Gromyko after usual Soviet line regarding (1) REDREP's being out of touch with German people and following unrealistic reunification policy; (2) impossibility of Soviet Government speaking for German people in GDR; and (3) Soviet desire for relaxation of tension, said, although Soviets would press for discussion of "questions ripe for solution", in particular Berlin and a German peace treaty, they would not evade other questions. If other participating powers were also resolved reduce tension conference could be possible success but this doubtful in Gromyko's view. Kroll interpreted this as indication of Khrushchev's desire to go to summit meeting especially in the US. Reported that he had heard that Khrushchev had given orders that nothing should be done to endanger this objective.

Kroll made following additional points in interpreting Gromyko's remarks.

- (1) Khrushchev is fanatically devoted to seven-year plan and is now faced with necessity of deciding on an investment program of huge proportions which could only be carried

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By AL NARA, Date 1-8-78

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carried out if considerable saving made on armaments. He wishes without question for long period of peace although he still distrusts west especially U.S. generals.

(2) What Khrushchev desires is confirmation of power position which has developed after world war II. He is convinced that he can reach his minimum demands, i.e., confirmation of present power structure, without making counter concessions because he does not believe that western solidarity is a reality.

(3) Major Soviet objective in Berlin crisis is international recognition of line running roughly along Elbe river. Will endeavor to make west confirm existence of two German states and recognize GDR. In relation to this objective Berlin itself is of secondary importance.

(4) Khrushchev would be willing to make not inconsiderable concessions in return for major objective. He would be willing for a period of several years to keep to a modified modus vivendi on Berlin provided (A) GDR controls replace Soviet controls in and around Berlin and (B) Berlin is purged as center for espionage and subversive activity.

WHITNEY

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